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GOVERNANCE PRACTICES AND CORPORATE VALUE – A RECENT 
LITERATURE SURVEY 
 
Ricardo P. C. Leal 
 
 
This article offers a survey of the recent international literature on 
the relationship between corporate governance practices and 
corporate value. The review includes a number of papers dealing 
with Brazil as well. The survey is organized in two sections. The first 
one examines the relationship between corporate value and 
voting rights and cash flow rights percentage holdings of 
controlling shareholders. The greater the separation between 
voting rights and control rights the greater the negative impact of 
voting rights concentration on corporate value should be. 
Corporate governance practices may also be gauged with 
indexes. A number studies have used existing indexes or built their 
own. A discussion on the possibility of performance and 
governance practices being endogenously determined is 
included in each section, with suggestions on how to treat the 
problem in empirical research. Governance practices are strongly 
associated to corporate value where there is less legal protection, 
such as in emerging markets like Brazil.   
 
Keywords: Corporate governance; corporate valuation; 
ownership and control; corporate governance indexes.  
 
Resumo. Este artigo oferece uma revisão da literatura internacional recente a 
respeito da relação entre governança corporativa e o valor de mercado da 
firma. O artigo também inclui alguns trabalhos feitos para o Brasil. A revisão está 
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dividida em duas partes. A primeira examina a relação entre o valor da 
companhia e a concentração dos direitos de voto e dos direitos sobre o fluxo 
de caixa dos acionistas controladores. Espera-se que quanto maior a 




da concentração dos direitos de voto sobre o valor da firma. A qualidade das 
práticas de governança corporativa da firma também pode ser medida com 
índices de práticas de governança. Estudos recentes utilizaram-se de índices 
existentes ou construíram seus próprios índices. Em cada seção foi incluída, 
também, uma discussão sobre a possibilidade de o valor da firma e as práticas 
de governança corporativa serem determinadas endogenamente, 
oferecendo-se sugestões para o tratamento empírico da questão. A qualidade 
das práticas de governança corporativa parece estar positivamente 
relacionada com o valor da firma, particularmente em países onde a proteção 
legal do investidor é pior, como em mercados emergentes e no Brasil.  
 
Palavras-chave: governança corporativa; valor da firma; controle e 





Recent studies suggest that the Berle and Means (1932) model of widely 
dispersed ownership is not common even in developed countries. Large block 
holders control a significant number of firms even in wealthier countries. La Porta, 
Lopes-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV) (1999) identified the ultimate owners 
of cash-flow and voting rights of firms in 27 developed countries that differ in 
origin of their laws and enforcement. They find that, except in economies with 
very good shareholder protection, relatively few firms are widely held. Most firms 
are controlled by families or by the state. Controlling shareholders’ voting rights 
typically exceed considerably their cash flow rights, mainly through the use of 
indirect control structures, such as pyramids. Pyramids are layers of companies 
that control a public company, many of them non-public, that allow control to 
be exerted with less investment. For example, if a person owns 50% plus 1 of the 
voting shares of a holding company that owns 50% plus 1 of the voting shares of 
a public company, that person has ultimate control of the public company by 
owning only 25% of cash flow rights (50% of 50%).  
 
Latest research highlights the importance of corporate governance in 
developed and emerging markets and suggests empirical relationships between 
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investor protection and corporate value. LLSV (1998, 2000a, 2002) evaluate the 
influence of investor protection and ownership by the controlling shareholder on 
corporate valuation. They conclude that better shareholder protection is 
associated with higher valuation of corporate assets and with more developed 
and valuable financial markets. When shareholders rights are better protected 
by law, outside investors are willing to pay more for financial assets such as 
equity and debt.  
 
This article is a selective survey of the recent  literature about the impact of 
corporate governance practices on corporate value and includes some 
Brazilian articles. There is a strong desire of practitioners, institutions and policy 
makers that promote good governance practices to believe that they lead to 
greater corporate value. The evidence is sometimes contradictory and there are 
measurement problems. How can one measure “good governance practices”? 
It is widely known that some practices are substitutes for others. More of the 
same should not impact value. There is also the issue of value added 
measurement, both in terms of how and when. It is reasonable to say that the 
impact of good corporate governance practices may not be best measured 
through market prices in emerging markets such as Brazil. 
 
Any survey is biased by its author’s choice of papers. This one is no 
different. I hope to offer a flavor of the literature as well as some of the most 
recent empirical results in Brazil. I apologize to the authors not included in this 
survey and hope that the papers mentioned are representative. Finally, my 
motivation to narrow this survey to the value added issue is the current stage of 
research in emerging markets like Brazil. Moreover, organizations, such as the 
World Bank, the OECD, the IADB, the Global Corporate Governance Forum 
(GCGF) and others, as well as initiatives such as Bovespa’s Novo Mercado, the 
Brazilian Institute of Corporate Governance’s  (IBGC) code of best practices, 
among others, advance good governance practices and searching for 
evidence that their efforts pay off is a worthwhile endeavor.  
 
There is a good number of recent international corporate governance 
surveys that will certainly deepen what is discussed below and that address 
several important aspects of corporate governance. Becht et alli (2002) is a 
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comprehensive survey of corporate governance and control research with an 
emphasis on Europe and the US. Claessens and Fan (2002) survey corporate 
governance practices and research in Asia. Dennis and McConnell (2003) 
review internat ional corporate governance issues. Gillan and Starks (2003) 
examine the role of institutional investors. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) 
concentrate on the board of directors as an endogenous corporate 
governance mechanism. John and Senbet (1998) also focus on the board while 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) provide an earlier overview of the corporate 
governance research.  
 
Assessments of the evolution of governance practices have been 
produced in the domestic literature. Aldrighi (2003) evaluates corporate 
governance mechanisms in the US and why many of them fail. Carvalho (2002) 
surveys recent initiatives and regulatory changes to improve governance 
practices in Brazil. He also discusses why corporate governance practices in 
Brazil lag those in other large economies. Carvalho (2000) also reviews the 
evolution of the Brazilian capital markets with an emphasis in the 1990’s. He 
concludes that the poor quality of legal investor protection is an impediment for 
the market growth. Hallqvist (2000) reviews the first code of best practices 
produced in Brazil by the IBGC. The IBGC has since released a revised version of 
its code. Lethbridge (1997) and Siffert (1998) offered early reviews of the 
international debate on corporate governance in Portuguese language. Leal 
and Saito (2003) review empirical corporate finance research in Brazil with an 
emphasis on corporate governance issues. Lustosa and Leal (2004) examine the 
role of institutional investors in Brazil and a few success and failed cases of 
activism.  
 
Claessens et al. (2001?) review potential corporate governance reforms in 
Brazil in an assessment of the Brazilian equity market made for the World Bank. 
They cast doubts about the possibility of a vibrant stock market ever developing 
in Brazil. They believe that equity markets are a high cost market because they 
need very good law enforcement and high quality information and institutions. 
They believe that strengthening minority shareholder rights and improving 
governance of institutional investors are other key policy goals. They review 
evidence that company management is not focused on maximizing shareholder 
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rights. Their article details specific measures to be taken if equity markets are to 
develop in Brazil.  
 
There are many ways to represent good corporate governance. One of 
them is to assess good board practices as a corporate governance mechanism. 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) survey the US and international literature. Leal 
and Oliveira (2002) survey board practices in Brazil. Dutra and Saito (2001) review 
board composition, practices and the use of cumulative voting in Brazil. Da 
Silveira et al. (2003) study the impact of board size, composition, and 
chairmanship on corporate value and find that firms that have different persons 
acting as the chairperson of the board and the CEO achieve greater market 
value.  
 
The conclusions of these Brazilian studies are that boards are still largely 
insider dominated. Independent directors still play a minor role. Minority 
shareholders do not use existing mechanisms for greater activism. However, 
steps towards greater board independence may have an effect on corporate 
value. The IBGC has been doing bi-annual assessments of corporate 
governance practices in Brazil but their sample is limited and may suffer from the 
usual survey biases. Their most recent survey concludes that awareness towards 
better governance practices is increasing, that the perceived benefits are 
associated to better company image and management, and that boards are 
more engaged in corporate strategic and performance issues (IBGC, 2003). As 
reported by Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), maybe the impact of good board 
practices may be better measured in times of crisis.  
 
This article will not focus on board practices but on concentration of cash 
flow rights and control rights concentration and on corporate governance 
indexes.  Cash flow and control rights and board practices may just be part of 
the story though. An alternative way to represent good corporate governance 
practices are indexes based on charter measures and company practices and 
actions. These indices pool many different aspects of corporate governance 
and aim to be a better construct to gauge the quality of corporate governance 





The article proceeds as follows. The first section discusses the issue of 
corporate control and its impact on corporate value. It is followed by a section 
on governance practices indexes and their relation with corporate value. A brief 
discussion of endog eneity is included in both sections because it presents a 
challenge to empirical research. The article closes with brief concluding remarks.  
 
 
2 CONTROL AND CASH FLOW RIGHTS 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) have 
provided important early contributions to research on ownership structures and 
corporate valuation. Jensen and Meckling concluded that concentrated 
ownership is beneficial to corporate valuation because large investors are better 
at monitoring managers. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny distinguish between the 
negative control effects (entrenchment) and the positive incentive effects of 
greater shares of ownership. They suggest that there are less conflicts of interest 
and greater shareholder value when ownership and control shares are the 
same. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) find that profitability rises with ownership 
concentration up to a point in the US, falling for larger concentrations. The rise is 
consistent with the incentive hypothesis but after a given point there is too much 
voting power concentration (entrenchment) and that leads to the fall in 
corporate value due to a greater likelihood of expropriation. This is sometimes 
called the inverted U-shaped relationship between ownership rights and value. 
This early literature focused on shareholder-manager conflicts.  
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997: 758-759) review the empirical evidence for the 
US and believe that that the ability of controlling shareholders to take 
advantage of minority shareholders is greater if they have superior voting rights, 
if the concentration of their voting rights is greater than the percentage of their 
cash flow rights (the wedge), if they use indirect control structures (pyramids) or 
non-voting shares. Claessens & al (2002) find evidence for entrenchment in Asia, 
Lins (2003) finds a consistent pattern for 18 emerging markets as well. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997:754-755) also comment that monitoring by large minority 
shareholders is effective only in countries with good investor protection. In 
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countries with poor investment protection, only a majority of ownership would be 
effective. This is exactly what we see in most countries.  
 
Brazil is no different and presents a very large concentration of control 
rights, according to Valadares (2002) and Valadares and Leal (2000) for 1996, 
Leal et alli (2000, 2002) for 1998, Carvalhal da Silva and Leal (2003) for 2000, and 
Leal and Carvalhal da Silva (2004a and 2004b) for 2002. All of these papers 
examine the direct and the indirect control structures and the latter ones also 
consider the effect of shareholder agreements. Early Brazilian evidence was 
presented by Procianoy (1994) and Procianoy and Comerlato (1994) who 
examine succession and related party transactions and their expropriation 
potential due to very high concentration of voting rights. Procianoy and 
Caselani (1997) find that controlling shareholders can be quite risk averse in 
Brazil.  
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997: 764) state that the ability, incentive, and easiness 
to vote for the board of directors is a common governance arrangement to 
grant minority shareholders voice because their investment is sunk in the firm. The 
same goes for inferior voting rights. Shleifer & Vishny (1997: 748, 759) present 
evidence of private benefits of control and minority shareholder expropriation 
through large control premiums. Nenova (2001) reports very high premiums for 
Brazil in a period in which tag along rights have been removed from the law. 
When these rights were reinstated, corporate values rose again. Becht et alli 
(2002: 35) discuss that indirect ownership structures may create strong incentives 
for expropriation of minority shareholders, particularly when coupled with the 
presence of non-voting shares. For instance, Claessens et alli (2002), Lins (2003) 
and Leal et alli (2000) find evidence that pyramids are negatively related to 
value for Asian countries, emerging markets, and Brazil, respectively. Nascimento 
(2000) and Procianoy and Schnorrenberger (2004) present evidence that the 
proportion of debt financing is inversely related to the percentage of voting 
rights of controlling shareholders in Brazil.  
 
Previous literature documents that there are both costs and benefits 
associated with ownership concentration. The presence of controlling 
shareholders may be harmful to the firm because their interests may not align 
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with those of non-controlling shareholders (Shleifer and Visnhy (1997) and LLSV 
(1998, 2000a, 2002)). Alternatively, the presence of controlling shareholders may 
not necessarily be detrimental to the firm. Large shareholders may mitigate the 
free rider problem of monitoring a management team, and hence reduce 
agency costs. LLSV (1999) argue that in countries where the legal and 
institutional frameworks do not offer sufficient protection to outside investors, 
concentrated ownership can mitigate shareholder conflicts. In any case, it is 
always possible to have expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling 
shareholders.  
 
Recent research (Shleifer and Vishny (1997), LLSV (1998, 2000a, 2002), and 
Claessens et alli (2002)) suggests that greater cash flow rights are associated with 
greater valuation. In contrast, the concentration of control rights and the 
separation of voting from cash flow rights are negatively related to firm value. 
This latter literature focuses on the conflicts between controlling shareholders 
and outside shareholders. When one or a few investors control a corporation, 
their actions may result in the expropriation of outside shareholders. Such 
companies are not attractive to outside shareholders and their shares may 
present lower market valuations.  
 
Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) traced back ultimate ownership and 
control of East Asian Corporations. In particular, they examined the extent of 
deviations from the one-share-one-vote rule, the use of pyramiding and cross-
holdings, the presence of single and multiple controlling owners, and the 
presence of controlling shareholders as top managers of the company. Their 
study showed that most East Asian firms are controlled by a single shareholder 
that often turns out to be a family. Pyramidal and cross-holding structures are 
very common. In contrast, the use of dual-class shares is very limited. They 
documented a significant separation of ultimate ownership and control, which is 
most pronounced among family-controlled firms and small firms. In a similar 
study, Faccio and Lang (2002) analyzed ultimate ownership and control in 
Europe and reported that families are the most frequent type of controlling 
shareholders and that there is a significant separation of ownership and control, 
mainly through the use of pyramids and cross-holdings. In the US, Anderson and 
Reeb (2003) assert that family ownership in S&P500 firms is beneficial to minority 
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shareholders. Families control about one third of the S&P500 firms with 
approximately 18% of the voting equity. While family ownership may be a 
suitable ownership structure for US firms at low levels of voting rights 
concentration, this may not be the case in emerging markets where 
concentration levels are much higher and where families leverage their control 
rights with the use of pyramids and non-voting shares.  
 
Claessens et alli (2002) and Lemmon and Lins (2003) separate the effects 
of control and cash flow ownership on the valuation of several East Asian 
markets and find that more concentrated control adversely affects valuation, 
while cash flow ownership affects it positively. Lins (2003) finds that market value 
is lower for firms with 5% to 20% of managerial ownership in 18 emerging markets 
but that managerial cash flow rights do not affect value. Lins also shows that the 
presence of large non-managerial block holders mitigates the negative effect of 
control concentration on value, particularly in countries with poor legal 
protection. Finally, he finds that the impact of pyramids is greater where legal 
investor protection is worse. This author includes Brazil in the sample but his 
empirical results are obtained by pooling all countries together. 
Wiwattanakantang (2001) investigates the effects of controlling shareholders on 
corporate performance in Thailand. The results indicate that the presence of 
controlling shareholders is associated with better performance, when measured 
by accounting measures such as the return on assets (ROA) and the sales-to-
assets ratio. Given that most firms in her sample do not implement control 
mechanisms to separate voting and cash flow rights, controlling shareholders 
might be self-constrained not to extract private benefits. This result is consistent 
with the evidence by Anderson and Reeb (2003) that family ownership is not 
bad to minority shareholders per se. Gibson (2003) examines CEO turnover in 
emerging markets and finds that turnovers are less likely in firms with large 
domestic shareholders, even when performance is poor. He labels governance 
practices in these firms as ineffective.  
 
The negative relationship between control rights and performance 
(entrenchment) and the positive relationship between cash flow rights and 
performance (incentives) are challenged by articles that control for 
endogeneity. The endogeneity problem arises when ownership, performance, 
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and investment are simultaneously determined. Ownership would affect 
performance but performance would also affect ownership through investment. 
Some of the empirical means of dealing with endogeneity are the use of control 
variables, modeling a system of simultaneous equations or looking at the 
reaction of firms during a truly exogenous event.  
 
Lemmon and Lins (2003) claim that they control for endogeneity because 
their empirical experiment compares the relationship between ownership and 
performance during an exogenous shock, the Asian crisis. They find that the 
negative effects on performance are greater when there is a greater separation 
between control and cash flow rights. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), for the US, 
claim that when they control for endogeneity the relationship between control 
rights and performance disappears. They test for the inverted U-shaped form 
observed for US firms by Morck et al. (1988) and use simultaneous equations. Cho 
(1998) also challenges the hypothesis that ownership is exogenously determined 
and affects value in the US using the same method. Actually, he finds just the 
opposite; performance affects ownership for the US. Coles et al. (2003) find 
support for the Morck et al. (1988) US results through a structural model but state 
that the usual methods to address the endogeneity problem may not work and 
that the endogeneity may be substantial anyway. Durnev and Kim (2003) state 
that governance practices are more important in countries with weak legal 
protection and that could explain the mixed results for the US and the stronger 
results found for Asia and Brazil, for example. That is my opinion as well. Emerging 
markets show ownership levels much higher than US ownership levels and results 
should be more clear-cut and less influenced by endogeneity in these markets. 
In any case, the careful empiricist is advised to consider that governance 
practices, performance and investment may be simultaneously determined in 
Brazil. To the best of our knowledge, the only Brazilian work that considered 
endogeneity was Leal and Carvalhal da Silva (2004a). Let’s now turn to Brazil.  
 
Valadares (2002), Valadares and Leal (2000), Leal et alli (2000, 2002), 
Carvalhal da Silva and Leal (2003), and Leal and Carvalhal da Silva (2004a) 
portrait the evolution of corporate control and ownership from 1996 to 2002. 
They analyze direct and indirect shareholding. Direct shareholders are those who 
own shares in the company itself. They consider all shareholders with 5% or more 
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of the voting capital. Five percent is the threshold for mandatory identification of 
shareholders in Brazil. Indirect ownership includes stockholders who ultimately 
control the company. For example, if a shareholder has 51% of a company that 
owns 80% of another company, the former has 40.8% of  cash flow rights (the 
total capital) of the latter company (51% times 80%) and controls 51% of the 
latter company (minimum of 51% and 80%). There may be slight variations in the 
method used in these papers, with no material difference in results. The latest 
papers, Carvalhal da Silva and Leal (2003) and Leal and Carvalhal da Silva 
(2004a and 2004b), calculate ultimate ownership percentages and adjust  for the 
existence of shareholder’s agreements. They consider the covenants in each 
agreement to adjust the cash flow and voting rights ownership percentages for 
the entire controlling block.  
 
These authors analyze shareholding composition backwards until they are 
able to classify the true owners into one of the following groups: family, 
institutional investors (banks, insurance companies, pension funds, foundations or 
investment funds), foreigners (either individuals or entities) and the government. 
Siffert (1998) reports on the ownership change of Brazilian firms between 1990 
and 1997, with less family and government controlled companies and more 
foreign and shareholder agreements controlled firms. Lins (2003) also reports 
direct and indirect ownership and control percentages for a smaller sample of 
Brazilian firms.  
 
The results of these papers are qualitatively the same and are summarized 
in Table 1. The data for 1998, 2000, and 2002 have been obtained from Leal and 
Carvalhal da Silva (2004a). They considered the existence of shareholder’s 
agreements. However, the data for 1996 come from Valadares and Leal (2000) 
who do not consider these agreements. To make the comparisons consistent, 
we looked at the 5 largest shareholders because those would very likely be the 
ones in a shareholder’s agreement in 1996. There is a high degree of 
concentration of voting and total capital as expected. The median ownership of 
voting rights for the 5 largest shareholders went from 79% to 89% between 1996 
and 2002. The median ownership of total capital for the 5 largest shareholder 
went from 49% to 54% between 1996 and 2002. Therefore, there is a substantial 
separation between voting and cash flow rights (wedge) and this separation has 
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been growing over time. Lins (2003) finds high concentration numbers as well for 
1995, close to the numbers reported for 1996 by Valadares and Leal (2000). His 
analysis considers only 59 Brazilian firms while Brazilian authors have considered 
many more firms as seen in Table 1. Lins’ (2003) results are biased towards the 
larger firms. The concentration of control rights and the leverage of control rights 
through the use of pyramids and non-voting shares are greater in Brazil now than 
what is portrayed by Lins for 1995.  
 
It is worth noting that the number of companies considered has 
decreased substantially, particularly those without a controlling shareholder 
(+50%). About half of the companies that have a controlling shareholder with 
more than 50% of the voting shares directly, most of the firms considered in Table 
1, are controlled by families, with foreigners coming in second. In 2000, Carvalhal 
da Silva and Leal (2003) report that 27% for the firms sampled had shareholder 
agreements, 86% had indirect control structures (pyramids), and that the voting 
shares represented 53% of the total capital on average. Siffert (1998) 
documented the increasing use of shareholder agreements in Brazil.  
 
Carvalhal da Silva and Leal (2003) related ownership and cash flow rights 
to value.  They find a negative non-linear relationship between voting rights 
concentration and market value, represented by a measure of Tobin’s q. They 
also find a negative relationship between the dividend payout and ownership 
concentration. Procianoy (1995) finds evidence of minority shareholder 
expropriation when he examines dividend policy changes associated with 
taxation changes in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. Their results support the 
idea of managerial entrenchment in Brazil. The same authors find weaker 
evidence of managerial alignment through a positive relationship between total 
capital concentration and value. These results are consistent with those of Lins 
(2003) that finds stronger evidence for entrenchment than for incentives. Earlier 
results by Leal et alli (2000) show that market values, represented by an estimate 
of Tobin’s q, are lower for firms that use indirect control structures to increase the 
wedge between voting and cash flow rights than when pyramids are present 




De Siqueira (1998) relates direct ownership to operating performance, 
measured through accounting returns and growth. His sample is possibly from 
1996 or 1997. He reports a very week relationship between operating 
performance and direct voting and cash flow rights concentration, consistent of 
latter studies. He also reports that smaller firms show lower voting rights 
concentration and firms in highly regulated industries, such as utilities, aviation, 
and banking, show more concentrated voting rights. More government 
regulation may represent more risk, thus the more concentrated ownership.  
 
Family ownership does not seem to particularly affect value in Brazil. Value 
is actually lower for government owned firms. When indirect control structures 
are present, value only seems to be lower when the separation between control 
rights and cash flow rights is greater. The relationship between ownership 
holdings and market value seems to be non-linear. There is little evidence that 
greater cash flow rights increase corporate value. The Brazilian results are 
consistent with the international evidence. Greater concentration of voting rights 
leveraged by the use of indirect control structures destroys value. However, 
family ownership, concentrated ownership, and the presence of indirect control 
structures by themselves may not affect value.  
 
 
3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES INDEXES 
 
A growing number of recent papers use corporate governance indexes. 
These indexes may be based on subjective or objective answers to a 
questionnaire. For example, CLSA (Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia) uses a 
questionnaire that is filled out by its analysts and that includes qualitative 
evaluations on his or her part or on the part of the respondents to compute a 
governance practices index. Patel et alli (2002) report on a transparency and 
disclosure index computed by Standard and Poor’s (S&P) using 98 true or false 
type of questions. Durnev and Kim (2003) use these two indexes and state that 
the S&P index is objective while the CLSA index has a qualitative component. 
Klapper and Love (2002) use the CLSA index for a number of emerging markets. 
Bauer et alli (2004) use an index of corporate governance practices for 




Barontini and Siciliano (2003) build their own index and define a number of 
dummies representing the risk of expropriation that depend on the existence of 
a controlling shareholder, the share of voting rights of large outside shareholders, 
and the existence of either pyramids or non-voting shares. Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996) recognize that mechanisms to control agency problems are 
interdependent, such as board composition and block shareholding. 
Correlations between any one of them with performance may be spurious 
because they may be compensated by another, non present, mechanism. The 
usual index building method does not ignore this substitution effect, also 
described by John and Senbet (1998: 391), because it simultaneously and 
addictively considers the existence of alternative mechanisms.  
 
Gompers et alli (2003) compute a corporate governance index for 1,500 
US companies consisting of the presence or not of 24 anti-takeover provisions 
and shareholder’s rights that can be objectively assessed. Each one of their 
index items is a dummy variable. The index is the simple sum of such variables. 
They find that greater shareholder’s rights are associated to greater corporate 
valuation and this association increases in time in the 1990’s. They find that 
governance practices are positively related to profits and sales growth and 
negatively related to capital expenditures and the amount of acquisitions. Core 
et al. (2004) expand on Gompers et al. They find a negative relation between 
poor governance practices and operating performance but this negative 
relationship does not show in stock prices.  
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997: 770) state that corporate governance in Italy 
must be much closer to the rest of the world than corporate governance in the 
US, Japan, or Germany. Barontini and Siciliano (2003) test if the risk of 
expropriation is associated with stock returns and the Tobin’s q of a sample of 
public Italian firms between 1991 and 2000. They use dummies to represent the 
risk of expropriation. Their dummies are associated to the proportion of voting 
rights by the controlling shareholder and the stock ownership of large outside 
shareholders, as well as to the presence of pyramids and non-voting shares. They 
also find no relationship between stock returns and the risk of expropriation and 
conclude that this is consistent with rational investors discounting stock prices in 
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anticipation of expropriation, as discussed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and 
suggested by the evidence in Core et alli (2004). They also find that Tobin’s q is 
lower for companies that present a higher risk of expropriation, particularly if they 
are controlled by the state or by families, and for holding companies. Their results 
are consistent with those of Bauer et alli (2004) for a sample of European 
companies. Interestingly, these authors find that corporate governance 
practices have a stronger positive relationship with corporate value in 
continental Europe, where legal protection is perceived as weaker, than in the 
UK.  
 
In the small sample of Brazilian companies used by Klapper and Love 
(2002), relative market valuations of companies were low, while the level of the 
governance index was high, suggesting a weak relationship between market 
value and governance. Patel et alli (2002) report an average firm-level S&P 
transparency and disclosure score of 32 for Brazil in 2000, low when compared to 
an average of 43 for emerging Asian markets and 55 for the highest ranking 
emerging market, South Africa. They find that the S&P index is negatively 
correlated with large shareholdings and positively correlated with price-to-book 
in Brazil. They sampled 30 Brazilian firms.  
 
Klapper and Love (2002) have noted that there is a large variation in 
CLSA’s measure of governance practices quality within specific countries. 
However, Brazil presents the third highest within-country homogeneity in the firm-
level governance index computed by CLSA. These authors also note that Brazil 
presents low relative market valuations while showing relatively high firm level 
governance indicators. These results, nevertheless, should be taken with caution 
because the number of Brazilian companies covered in the study (24) is very 
small, including  mostly companies that listed ADRs in the US and are, therefore, 
very similar in terms of their governance practices.  
 
Articles that have examined several countries, such as Klapper and Love 
(2002) and Durnev and Kim (2003), have found that there is a relationship 
between the governance practice index used and corporate value. In countries 
where the legal protection is worse, better governance practices have an even 
greater impact on market value. However, Klapper and Love (2002) establish 
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that even though better governance practices mitigate poor legal investor 
protection, they are not a perfect substitute for it. Improving the legal system 
continues to be important.  
 
Leal and Carvalhal da Silva (2004a and b) follow LLSV (1998) and Barontini 
and Siciliano (2003) in spirit by including only aspects that can be objectively 
assessed in their index without the need to interview or survey interested parties. 
They produce an index based on information that can be objectively obtained 
from public sources, such as the mandatory filings with the Brazilian Securities 
Commission (CVM, in Portuguese), company annual and periodic reports, and 
websites. They structure their index based on codes of best practices. The main 
influence comes from the Code of Best Practices of IBGC. They also use the 
OECD code of best practices. Brazil has a second code of best practices 
produced by the CVM and they use it as well. These codes provide the 
framework to select the items to be measured in the index. Finally, they use 
control variables introduced in other studies, such as Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996), Klapper and Love (2002), Gompers et alli (2003), and Barontini and 
Siciliano (2003). They build their index similarly to Gompers et alli (2003). They 
developed a set of 24 questions. If the answer is “yes” to any given question they 
interpret it as a good governance practice or as a pro-shareholder provision or 
action and attribute the value of “1” to the variable that otherwise is null. The 
index is the simple sum of the values of 1 or 0 assigned to each question.  
 
Leal and Carvalhal da Silva (2004b) investigate the relationship between 
the quality of a firm´s corporate governance practices index and its valuation 
and performance. Their panel data results for the 1998-2002 period indicate that 
less than 4% of Brazilian firms have “good” corporate governance practices, and 
that firms with better corporate governance practices have higher market 
valuations (Tobin´s q) and better operating performance (return on assets). Their 
results confirm those in other emerging markets. Better governance practices do 
pay off. Similar studies about Korea, by Black et al. (2003), and about 
Switzerland, by Beiner et al. (2004), offer similar conclusions. These two studies 
also offer the interested reader implementations of corporate governance 
indexes as well as of endogeneity tests. Beiner et al. (2004) also find reverse 
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causality for Swiss firms. Highly valued firms seem to adopt better governance 
practices as well as better governance practices seem cause higher value.  
 
Carvalho (2002) and Srour (2002) present evidence that firms associated 
with better governance practices show greater market valuations or lose less 
value in times of stress, such as during the period following the terrorist attacks in 
the US in 2001. They compare firms that are listed in Bovespa’s “Novo Mercado” 
or that have level II or better ADR’s listed in the US. Both types of listings required 
greater commitments in terms of disclosure, transparency, and shareholder rights 
than what is required by the Brazilian securities laws. Although these articles do 
not construct a governance index, they use more stringent listing requirements 
as proxies for better governance practices. The results from Srour (2002) are 
consistent with those of Lemmon and Lins (2003) for a larger sample of emerging 
markets. These authors also examined corporate values during a time of crisis.  
 
Klapper and Love (2002) and Barontini and Siciliano (2003) argue that 
there may be an endogeneity problem when performance measures are 
correlated with proxies for good governance practices, such as control and 
cash flow concentration or a governance practices index. Leal and Carvalhal 
da Silva (2004a) address this issue through as system of simultaneous equations. 
The issue of endogeneity can be represented using the circular notation of 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) combined with the simultaneous equation 









1    
      (1) 
Equation 1 represents the kind of test performed by Klapper and Love 
(2002), with c as a vector of governance practices measures, such as the index 
or ownership percentages, and X as a vector of control variables that are 
associated with governance practices as well. Equations such as 1, one for each 
governance practice, may be included in a simultaneous equation system, as in 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), with the performance (Q) equation represented 
by equation 2. If the coefficients of c in equation 2, simultaneously determined, 
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are still significant, this will be an indication that the net effect of alternate 












There is evidence that good corporate governance practices may lead to 
lower cost of capital and greater market valuations for companies. Investors in 
countries with poor legal protection discount the prices of firms to compensate 
for expropriation. However, lower stock prices may not raise demand enough in 
these countries, keeping the supply of outside equity limited (Shleifer and 
Wolfenzon (2002)). It would be reasonable to assume that outside equity 
financing would increase if the risk of expropriation is reduced through better 
legal protection and better corporate governance practices.  
 
Some of the studies reviewed also show that there is a relationship 
between the insider voting rights holdings and corporate value. In the US, at very 
low levels of insider voting rights holdings, value increases. It then flattens out and 
decreases at higher levels of insider voting rights holdings. Nonetheless, the 
percentage of voting rights held by insiders in the US is relatively lower when 
compared to emerging markets. In Asia and in Latin America, there seems to a 
negative relationship between the percentage of voting rights held by insiders 
and corporate value. This relationship is stronger and significant when insiders use 
mechanisms to leverage their voting rights. For example, the use of indirect 
control structures, such as pyramids, allows insiders to keep control of the 
company by investing less of their own money. The same can be said about the 
widespread use of non-voting shares in Brazil. The negative effect of increasing 
voting rights with insiders and value is called entrenchment. There is evidence of 
insider entrenchment, particularly outside the US. Insiders have an incentive to 
act in the interest of minority shareholders if they hold a greater share of total 
capital. The evidence for the incentive effect is not as clear as with the 




Several papers have used corporate governance practices indexes and 
related them to corporate value, stock returns, and the operating performance 
of companies. Once again, the better the corporate governance practices of a 
firm the greater its market value. However, the evidence is not as clear when 
one used operating performance measures and stock prices. There is always the 
possibility that governance practices, value, and investment are endogenous. 
Therefore, researchers that sought to find causality among these concepts 
without considering that they may be simultaneously determined may be at 
error. It is very important that researchers model the potential endogenous 
nature of value in relation to corporate governance practices.  
 
Finally, Brazil presents extremely high levels of insider holdings of voting 
shares. In fact, ultimate voting shares percentages controlled by the largest 
shareholder have been increasing over the years. Ultimate voting rights are 
those that consider the existence of indirect control structures and shareholder’s 
agreements. More than 80% of the firm present some sort of indirect control 
structure and the degree of leverage of voting rights through the use of these 
structures and of non-voting shares is severe. There is evidence of entrenchment 
in Brazilian companies but no significant evidence of insider incentives.  
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Indirect Shareholding Composition of Brazilian Companies 1996-2002 
 
Median indirect shareholding of Brazilian companies listed on the São 
Paulo Stock Exchange for the 5 largest shareholders. Such participation was 
analyzed backwards until the shareholder was identified to be from one of the 
following groups: (i) individuals or families; (ii) foreign investors (individuals or 
institutions); (iii) government; (iv) institutional investors (banks, insurance firms, 
pension funds or investment funds). A company with a majority shareholder is 
one where a single shareholder has more than 50% of the voting capital directly. 
Data obtained from Valadares and Leal (2000) for 1996 and Leal & Carvalhal da 
Silva (2004a) for 1998, 2000, and 2002.  
 
 Companies with a 
majority shareholder 




















1996 83% 50% 203 72% 48% 122 79% 49% 325 
1998 88% 53% 195 80% 45% 45 86% 52% 240 
2000 89% 57% 197 70% 39% 39 88% 54% 236 
2002 90% 57% 183 72% 45% 31 89% 54% 214 
 
